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Anyone who tracks the popular business literature has come across at least one article 
or book, if not a half dozen, that applies the insights of cognitive science and behavioral 
economics to individual and organizational decision making.1  These authors apply social 
science research to the question of why so many strategic decisions yield disappointing 
results, despite extensive research and planning and the availability of data about how 
strategies are (or are not) performing. 
The diagnosis is that many of our decisions rely on mental shortcuts or “cognitive traps,” 
which can lead us to make uninformed or even bad decisions.2  Shortcuts provide time-pres-
sured staff with simple ways of making decisions and managing complex strategies that play 
out an uncertain world. These shortcuts affect how we access information, what information 
we pay attention to, what we learn, and whether and how we apply what we learn. Like all 
organizations, foundations and the people who work in them are subject to these same traps. 
Many foundations are attempting to make better decisions by investing in evaluation 
and other data collection efforts that support their strategic learning. The desire is to 
generate more timely and actionable data, and some foundations have even created staff 
positions dedicated entirely to supporting learning and the ongoing application of data for 
purposes of continuous improvement.3  
While this is a useful and positive trend, decades of research have shown that despite the best of 
intentions, and even when actionable data is presented at the right time, people do not automat-
ically make good and rational decisions. Instead, we are hard-wired to fall into cognitive traps 
that affect how we process (or ignore) information that could help us to make better judgments. 
1  For example, Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. Heath, C., & Heath, 
D. (2013). How to make better choices in life and work. New YorK: Crown Business. Thaler, R., & Sunstein, C. (2009). 
Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. New York: Penguin.
2 Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 1124-1131.
3 Coffman, J., Beer, T., Patrizi, P., & Thompson, E. (2013). Benchmarking evaluation in foundations: Do we know what 
we are doing? The Foundation Review, 5(2),36-51.
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Foundations need to build new ways of thinking and interaction that help to com-
bat cognitive traps, support rigorous inquiry, and foster more deliberative decision 
making. This brief highlights several common cognitive traps that can trip up philanthrop-
ic decision making, and suggests straightforward steps that strategists, evaluators, and 
organizational learning staff can take to address them.
COMMON COGNITIVE TRAPS IN PHILANTHROPY
Cognitive traps can hinder any decision a foundation makes about its strategies. This includes 
HDUO\VWUDWHJ\GHYHORSPHQWGHFLVLRQVVXFKDVKRZWRGHĆQHWKHSUREOHPEHLQJDGGUHVVHG
how to construct a theory of change to address it, and which grantees are best suited to do 
the work. It also includes decisions made during implementation, such as whether strategy 
adjustments are needed or whether to renew funding for certain activities or grantees.
Five cognitive traps that commonly affect philanthropy are described below. For each, 




and organizations they support, as well as the strategies and theories of change they 
develop. Based on extensive research and planning, program staff draw conclusions about 
the nature of a problem and the scope of possible solutions to it, and then commit to part-
ners and particular courses of action. As strategies unfold, grant reports, evaluations, and 
partner feedback provide data about how their bets are playing out. Ideally, foundations 
use data and learning about what is and is not working to make ongoing decisions about 
funding, the provision of auxiliary supports, and the development of new partnerships 
WRVXSSRUWWKHVWUDWHJ\%XWEHFDXVHRIWKHHPRWLRQDOĆQDQFLDODQGRWKHUFRPPLWPHQWV
Why do our brains get caught in cognitive traps?
In his book Thinking, Fast and Slow, Nobel prize-winning economist Daniel Kahneman explains that our brains 
operate with two processing systems: 
• System 1 makes rapid intuitive decisions based on associative memory, images, and emotional reactions. 
It is fast, automatic, intuitive, and runs largely in unconscious mode. 
• System 2 is our slow, deliberate, analytical, and effortful mode of reasoning about the world. System 2 
monitors the output of System 1 and is supposed to override it when our emotional hunches or quick 
DVVXPSWLRQVFRQćLFWZLWKORJLFSUREDELOLW\RUVRPHRWKHUGHFLVLRQPDNLQJUXOH
But the problem is that System 2 is lazy and tires easily, often missing important moments when logic or 
SUREDELOLW\ZRXOGOHDGXVWRDGLIIHUHQWFRQFOXVLRQWKDQRXUĆUVWFKRLFHRIUHDFWLRQ7KHUHIRUHZHDFWRQ
mental shortcuts—or cognitive traps—making bad decisions that a more deliberate engaging of System 2 could 
have prevented.
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
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foundations have made to people, ideas, and 
actions, many points along this cycle of action 




and opinions about how the world works, and 
to overlook or ignore data that refute them. 
This bias is unwitting; we fall prey to it uninten-
tionally and unconsciously. Worse yet, the more 
expertise we have in a particular content area, 
the more susceptible we are to it because we so 
HDVLO\EHFRPHRYHUFRQĆGHQWDERXWWKHULJKW-
ness of our opinions. 
&RQĆUPDWLRQELDVDOVRJHWVLQWKHZD\RI
high-quality decisions in other ways:
• We apply more scrutiny to data and infor-
PDWLRQWKDWGLVFRQĆUPZKDWZHEHOLHYH
WKDQWRGDWDWKDWFRQĆUPLW,QRWKHUZRUGVZHUHTXLUHDKLJKHUOHYHORIHYLGHQFHWR
prove things that we do not want to be true, while our standard of evidence for things 
we want to be true is much lower. 
• We interpret ambiguous or equivocal evidence as supportive of our existing positions.
• We apply more weight to information acquired early and form an initial opinion, and 
then evaluate information acquired later in a way that is partial to that opinion.
:KHUHWRZDWFKIRUFRQĆUPDWLRQELDV
• During initial strategy development. Foundations commonly begin strategy planning with 
an environmental scan and expert interviews that identify where the most pressing 
problems are in an area and how philanthropy might help to address them. Although this 
SURFHVVW\SLFDOO\VHHNVDPL[RIVWDNHKROGHUSHUVSHFWLYHVFRQĆUPDWLRQELDVFDQOHDGXV
to talk only to individuals who interpret problems and see possible solutions in similar 
ways. After all, interviewees typically include those we already know and with whom we 
already have worked. Contradictory opinions or evidence are often dropped from analy-
sis as “outliers” after initial decisions about the course of action are made. This can result 
LQDIDOVHVHQVHRIFHUWDLQW\DQGFRQĆGHQFHDERXWDSODQDQGLWVDELOLW\WRVXFFHHG
• When evaluation data are presented. (YDOXDWRUVRIWHQIDFHFRQĆUPDWLRQELDVZKHQEULQJ-
LQJPLGFRXUVHĆQGLQJVWRSURJUDPVWDIIIRULQWHUSUHWDWLRQ3URJUDPVWDIIFRPHWRWKH
table with deep investments in the issue (both emotionally and because their success 




compounded if favorable results and examples are then cherry picked further for pre-
sentation to executive management or foundation boards.  
Decisions at high risk  
RIFRQĆUPDWLRQELDV 
are those where decision 
makers:
• Have a high level of expertise  
or experience in the topic area
• Are emotionally invested in the 
issue
• Have deeply entrenched beliefs 
about how something works or 
ought to work
• Regularly interact with a cohort of 
like-minded thinkers
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Escalation of Commitment
Many foundations make big bets on particu-
lar solutions, investing in multimillion-dollar 
strategies that are implemented for years or 
even decades. Funders also commonly com-
mit long-term to big investments in particular 
grantees. But the nature of bets is that they do 
not always work out as expected, although an 
outside observer would rarely know it because 
foundations abandon their bets and concede 
failure so infrequently. One reason for this is 
the cognitive trap of escalation of commitment, 
ZKLFKPDNHVLWGLIĆFXOWWRUHYLVLWSDVWFKRLFHV
Escalation of commitment happens when we 
remain committed to our ideas and invest-
ments even when data clearly demonstrate 
that the future cost of continuing support 
RXWZHLJKVWKHH[SHFWHGEHQHĆWV. We fall into 
this trap because it is painful to pull the plug on 
something in which we have invested a great 
deal of time and money. 4  We think, “We’ve 
worked so hard, we can’t quit now!” regardless 
of evidence that our approach is failing or not 
living up to expectations. 
One hypothesis for why we are so suscepti-
ble to escalation of commitment is that our 
feelings of personal responsibility for an 
investment’s failure coupled with our natural 
desire to see ourselves as competent make 
us convince ourselves that the failing investment will turn around if we simply invest even 
more. Also, our natural aversion to loss causes us to place greater value on not losing what 
we have already invested than on gaining the same amount or more in the future. 5 
Where to watch for escalation of commitment
• During strategy development and approval. Many program staff commit extraordinary 
energy during strategy development to research, stakeholder consultations, and gru-
eling theory of change processes that attempt to project strategic outcomes far into 
the future.6 This iterative process of strategic brainstorming, researching, devising, and 
UHĆQLQJFDQRIWHQWDNHD\HDURUPRUHEHIRUHDVWUDWHJ\LVUHDG\WREHYHWWHGLQWHUQDOO\
or externally.  
 
4Staw, B. (1976). Knee-deep in the big muddy: A study of escalating commitment to a chosen course of action. Organi-
zational Behavior and Human Performance, 16, 27-44.
5Kelly, T., & Milkman, K. (2013). Escalation of commitment. In E.H. Kessler (Ed.) Encyclopedia of Management Theory. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
6Patrizi, P. & Thompson, E.H, (2011). Beyond the veneer of strategic philanthropy. The Foundation Review, 2(3), 52-60.
Decisions at risk for 
escalation of commitment 
are those where a 
foundation:
• Commits resources to a course of 
action in the hope of achieving a 
positive outcome  
• Experiences disappointing results
The likelihood for 
escalation of commitment 
increases as:
• “Sunk costs” of the investment 
increase
• The project is nearer to completion
• Failure can be attributed to 
unexpected outside forces
• The individual or team members 
who made the original decision 
are the same ones responsible for 
deciding whether to continue or 
change paths
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This enormous investment of time upfront is fueled by the best of intentions; program 
staff want to be responsible stewards of foundation resources. But it also means that 
even before a strategy has gone to foundation executives and boards, staff already 
are highly invested in their chosen course of action and averse to questions about it or 
VXJJHVWLRQVWRUHĆQHLW3URJUDPVWDIIGUHDGWKHWKRXJKWRIKDYLQJWKHLUVWUDWHJLHVTXHV-
WLRQHGDQGKDYLQJWRUHYLVLWGHFLVLRQVDQGUHZULWHOHQJWK\VWUDWHJ\MXVWLĆFDWLRQVLIKROHV
are poked in their plans. Therefore, by the time strategies are presented to executives 
or board members, they are highly polished packages. Every challenge has been antici-
pated, every word carefully crafted, and the strategy’s presentation has been carefully 
rehearsed in order to head off challenging questions. As upfront investments in strat-
egy development increase, the likelihood that plans will be changed decreases, even in 
response to the most legitimate and insightful strategy questions.
• With organizational systems and processes. Foundations have grantmaking processes 
and systems that staff across the organization use. These might include, for example, 
electronic grants management systems, dashboards or other reporting structures, and 
knowledge management and communications processes. Escalation of commitment 
can occur with these systems (even when they are not all that useful) because it often 
WDNHVVLJQLĆFDQWWLPHDQGUHVRXUFHVWRGHYHORSWKHPDQGWUDLQVWDIIRQKRZWRXVHWKHP
FRUUHFWO\)RXQGDWLRQVWKDWKDYHPDGHVLJQLĆFDQWLQYHVWPHQWVLQDJUDQWVPDQDJHPHQW
system, for example, will often continue to use a poorly performing system and patch 
together needed workarounds so they can get their money’s worth from their initial 
LQYHVWPHQWHYHQZKHQGDWDDQGH[SHULHQFHVKRZWKDWSDWFKHVDQGORVWWLPHIURPLQHIĆ-
ciency going forward will cost more than moving to a new system altogether.
Availability Bias
Philanthropy is full of vivid stories. Staff, boards, 
and donors often are moved to invest and act 
by compelling stories of how individuals are 
affected by problems, or by inspiring stories of 
promising solutions to address them. In addi-
tion, foundations often emphasize individual 
stories of change to communicate their suc-
cesses, both internally (e.g., in board presenta-
tions) and externally (e.g., in annual reports). 
As useful and moving as inspiring stories can 
be from a communications standpoint, they 
also can cause foundations to misdiagnose the 
drivers of a problem, select solutions that lack 
VXIĆFLHQWUHDFKDQGPLVXQGHUVWDQGWKHGHJUHHRISURJUHVVDFFRPSOLVKHG7KLVLVEHFDXVH
vivid, well-told, and frequently repeated stories contribute to a cognitive trap called avail-
ability bias.  
$YDLODELOLW\ELDVPDNHVYLYLGHYHQWVRUH[DPSOHVWKDWFRPHHDVLO\WRPLQGVHHPPRUH
likely to occur. It makes us inaccurately estimate frequency or probability. 
Easy access to memories of a story or a particular event causes us to believe that the 
event is much more common or possible than it really is, and to overestimate the likeli-
Availability bias is 
stronger when decision 
makers’ minds have easy 
access to:
• Experiences or stories with deep 
emotional impact
• Vivid images
• Examples that are particularly 
salient to one’s own life
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hood of similar things happening in the future. For example, we overestimate the threat 
RUIUHTXHQF\RIKRUULĆFHYHQWVOLNHVFKRROVKRRWLQJVSODQHFUDVKHVDQGWHUURULVWDWWDFNV
during the months after well-publicized events occur because memories of those stories 
are still fresh and impactful. This can lead to policy decisions that address the risk of ex-
tremely rare events while far more likely risks are left unaddressed. Availability bias also is 
present when highly visible stories of technology entrepreneurs who become extraordi-
narily wealthy after a public offering leads employees in new startups to overestimate the 
SRWHQWLDOEHQHĆWVRIFKRRVLQJVWRFNRSWLRQVRYHUDKLJKHUVDODU\HYHQWKRXJKLWLVPXFK
more likely that the startup will fail or never see the same kind of returns.
Where to watch for availability bias
• During strategy implementation. Most program staff in foundations are engaged 
grantmakers—they monitor grantees, check on their progress, and conduct site visits 
WRLQWHUDFWZLWKWKHZRUNĆUVWKDQG:KHQDVVHVVLQJDVWUDWHJ\èVSURJUHVVPDNLQJ
decisions about its future, and thinking about what a whole cohort of grantees might 
need, staff who monitor and conduct site visits with multiple grantees can easily focus 
on the most recent site visit or the most dramatic and salient example of a challenge 
or success, rather than the most common observations. 
• When interpreting or communicating strategy progress. Evaluators, program staff, and 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQVRIĆFHUVVKRXOGEHZDUHRIDYDLODELOLW\ELDVZKHQUHSRUWLQJUHVXOWVRQ
strategy progress. Oftentimes, particularly when presenting results to foundation 
ERDUGVLOOXVWUDWLYHVWRULHVRUTXRWHVDUHXVHGWRKLJKOLJKWHYDOXDWLRQĆQGLQJVOHVVRQV
learned, or successes. Choosing the most dramatic stories or quotes rather than the 
most representative ones can lead strat-
egists and decision makers to a wrong 
understanding of what is happening. 
While this may be appropriate for founda-
tion public relations and communications 
materials, it can get in the way of good 
decision making based on more systemat-
ic and comprehensive data and evidence.  
Bounded Awareness
Most foundations specialize long-term in 
certain program areas, such as children and 
families, the environment, mental health, or 
education. These areas often are based on the 
interests of the founders, and over the course 
of investments that span many decades foun-
dations develop deep expertise and known 
legacies in those areas.
This long-term specialization has numerous 
EHQHĆWV,WDOORZVIRXQGDWLRQVWRH[SORUHYDULHG
strategies for solving particular problems and 
to learn a great deal about what approaches do 
and do not work. It also allows them to develop a 
Bounded awareness 
happens when:
• Change occurs gradually, making 
us more likely to miss critical 
signals.
• We are highly focused on looking 
IRUVSHFLĆFNLQGVRIFKDQJHV
making us likely to miss others 
that may be of equal or more 
importance.
Costs of bounded 
awareness are highest 
when:
• Decisions are high priority. We 
oversearch for information in low-
priority decisions, and undersearch 
when they are high priority.
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GHHSXQGHUVWDQGLQJDERXWWKHĆHOGRIRUJDQL]DWLRQVæQRQSURĆWVDQGRWKHUIXQGHUVæZRUNLQJ
in a particular area and their unique strengths and weaknesses. This knowledge both informs 
grantee selection and helps funders to make connections that can lead to useful collabora-
tions. Presumably, a foundation would get smarter and more strategic the longer it invested in 
an area. But one cognitive trap seriously challenges this presumption—bounded awareness. 
Bounded awareness occurs when we fail to see, seek, use, or share highly relevant and 
readily accessible information.7 We tend to operate with blinders at multiple points in the 
decision-making process—when we ignore critical facts, fail to notice changes occurring 
gradually around us, or miss the importance of the information we have. 
Bounded awareness is not simply about information overload, or about making decisions 
ZLWKWRRPXFKLQIRUPDWLRQDQGWRROLWWOHWLPH(YHQZKHQZHDUHQRWêGULQNLQJIURPDĆUH
hose” of information8 and have the luxury of time to make complex decisions, we still fail to 
bring the right information into our conscious awareness when we need it.9
Where to watch for bounded awareness
• When selecting goals. Many foundations practice strategic philanthropy, aiming to 
DFKLHYHWKHLURZQFOHDUO\GHĆQHGJRDOVSXUVXLQJWKRVHJRDOVLQFROODERUDWLRQZLWK
grantees, and then tracking their success in achieving the goals.10 The selection 
RIVSHFLĆFDQGPHDVXUDEOHJRDOVWREHDFKLHYHGRQDGHĆQHGWLPHOLQHHQFRXUDJHV
foundations to focus, which many perceive as a smart and strategic way for founda-
tions to achieve impact with limited resources. However, for foundations practicing 
strategic philanthropy, there can be a danger of becoming overly focused. Focus limits 
awareness, leading us to miss or ignore important information and opportunities that 
fall outside of our area of concentration. Strategies and objectives focused on achiev-
ing those goals create boundaries that can frame the issue in an overly narrow way, 
FDXVLQJXVWRRYHUORRNRWKHUDSSURDFKHVWKDWPLJKWEHPRUHHIĆFLHQWRUHIIHFWLYHDW
solving problems. 
• When developing theories of change. When identifying theories of how strategies will play 
out and achieve short- and long-term change, foundations can be particularly suscepti-
ble to bounded awareness, which causes them to replicate familiar activities rather than 
to look at new ideas or explore fully what might be needed for change. For example, if a 
foundation has a long tradition of funding coalitions to achieve policy goals, and those 
coalitions have been largely successful, that foundation is more likely to fund coalitions 
DJDLQUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRIWKHVROXWLRQ,WLVGLIĆFXOWWREUHDNIUHHIURP
patterns, in part because bounded awareness prevents us from seeing alternatives. 
Groupthink
Many foundations try to improve the quality of their decision making and to reduce the silos 
that often occur across program areas by encouraging the use of group or team decision 
7Chugh, D., & Bazerman, M. (2007). Bounded awareness: What you fail to see can hurt you. Mind and Society, 6(1), 1-18. 8 
Frank, C. J, & Magnone, P. F. (2011). 'ULQNLQJIURPWKHĆUHKRVH0DNLQJVPDUWHUGHFLVLRQVZLWKRXWGURZQLQJLQLQIRUPDWLRQ 
New York: Portfolio/Penguin.
9 Bazerman, M., & Chugh, D. (2006). Decisions without blinders. Harvard Business Review, 84(1), 88-97.
10 Brest, P. (2012). A decade of outcome-oriented philanthropy. Stanford Social Innovation Review, 10(2), 42-47.
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making, both internal and external. They hope 
that by pulling individuals from different 
departments, such as communications, evalu-
ation, or other program areas, or by creating 
advisory groups with outside stakeholders, 
decisions will be informed by multiple and di-
verse perspectives. This is based on belief that 
there is more “wisdom in crowds,” or that the 
aggregation of information in groups generally 
results in decisions that are better than those 
that could have been made by any single mem-
ber of the group.11
While this can be an effective way to combat 
cognitive traps in the initial stages of working 
together, the ability of teams to challenge traps can drop over time. In fact, the individual 
biases described above tend to be compounded rather than mitigated when we work in 
groups and teams because of the cognitive trap groupthink.
Groupthink happens when the desire for harmony in a decision-making group over-
rides a realistic appraisal of alternative ideas or viewpoints. Small groups that have 
worked together for years are particularly susceptible to this “culture of cordiality,” as 
group members start to see the world in the same way and unintentionally shut down 
opportunities for innovations or disregard contrary ideas and evidence. Our natural aver-
VLRQWRFRQćLFWPDNHVXVYXOQHUDEOHWRJURXSWKLQN12 
Where to watch for groupthink
• In any foundation group. Foundations are full of teams and group meetings. For ex-
ample, most foundations have teams at both the initiative and overall program-area 
levels that are made up of program staff who manage grants within those areas. 
For many foundations, program staff attrition is low and team membership remains 
relatively stable over time. Teams meet regularly—weekly, biweekly, or monthly—to 
talk about grantmaking processes, discuss progress, problem solve challenges, and 
explore new opportunities. Because these groups tend to be so stable and these 
meetings occur with such regularity, the process of meeting itself can become rote 
and insular, making the team susceptible to groupthink. With regular meetings locked 
into electronic calendars months in advance, little consideration is given to “mixing it 
up” every once in a while—inviting others to attend, changing the format and agenda, 
or alternating who leads the group.
• During strategy implementation. While external perspectives often are sought during 
the strategy development process, it is much less common for teams to invite out-
siders back in to help monitor the strategy once it hits the ground, and to consider 
HYDOXDWLYHĆQGLQJVDVWKH\FRPHLQDQGWKHLULPSOLFDWLRQV





• Strong directive leadership
• Time pressure
• Important and complex decisions
11 Surowiecki, J. (2004). The wisdom of crowds: Why the many are smarter than the few and how collective wisdom shapes 
business, economies, societies and nations. New York: Anchor Books.
12 Janis, I.L. (1982). *URXSWKLQN3V\FKRORJLFDOVWXGLHVRISROLF\GHFLVLRQVDQGĆDVFRHV%RVWRQ+RXJKWRQ0LIćLQ
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1 Use devil’s advocacy.     
2 Invite an outsider’s 
perspective.
   
3 /RRNIRUGLVFRQĆUPLQJ
evidence and ask for 
the bad news.
 
4 Focus on trends 
rather than individual 
experiences.

5 Remind yourself what 
you do not know.
  









8 Encourage course 
corrections.

9 Develop decision 
teams that include 
more than the original 
decision makers.
   
10 Build earlier check-
ins into the strategy 
approval process.
  
11 Reduce upfront 
strategy planning time 
in favor of ongoing 
strategy development.
 
SUMMARY OF TECHNIQUES TO COMBAT  
COGNITIVE TRAPS
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TECHNIQUES TO COMBAT COGNITIVE TRAPS
Making sure we do not fall prey to cognitive traps requires more than being aware that 
they exist. Being aware does not make us better able to avoid them. We actually have to 
employ approaches that deliberately counteract our tendency to take shortcuts. 
The techniques that follow are ideas that foundations can build into existing processes 
and grantmaking cycles to combat cognitive traps. Some relate to how people interact 
with each other or to what information is sought and how that information is considered. 
They suggest redesigning decision-making opportunities and moments to consider care-
fully who is participating, what questions the team is asking, and what data are brought 
to the table. Others suggest some broader restructuring of organizational processes and 
culture.  
1. Use devil’s advocacy.
A devil’s advocate is someone who takes a position that he or she does not necessarily 
agree with for the sake of argument, and then seeks to engage others in an argumentative 
discussion. Use of this technique involves intentionally assigning someone to play devil’s 
advocate during a meeting when decisions are being made or when evaluation data are 
being reviewed or interpreted. The devil’s advocate might be asked to offer several rea-
sons why something is a bad idea, or why a particular position might fail. It can be especial-
ly effective to ask a strong advocate of a particular course of action to switch to the devil’s 
advocate role midway through a discussion. 
2. Invite an outsider’s perspective.
There are two perspectives on any given decision—an insider’s and an outsider’s. Insiders 
tend to be more biased and to look at individual situations or decisions as unique. Out-
siders are more capable of generalizing beyond an individual situation and bringing other 
experiences to the table when making decisions. Outsiders tend to make better deci-
sions than insiders because they incorporate broader and relevant data from previous 
decisions.13 Experience shows, however, that too rarely we invite outside perspectives, 
and when we do, we tend to discount them as less informed or relevant. This technique 
involves simply inviting outsiders to participate in strategic discussions when important 
decisions are being made. An outsider may be, for example, a foundation staff member 
from another program area, or someone outside of the foundation altogether. 
3. Look for GLVFRQĆUPLQJ evidence and ask for the bad news.
7KHVHDUFKIRUGLVFRQĆUPLQJHYLGHQFHæRUWKDWVRPHWKLQJLVnot working as intended—
actually provides more useful insights and learning than looking for evidence that some-
thing is working as intended. We process bad information more thoroughly than good.14 
Many monitoring and evaluation processes, however, are designed to seek evidence that 
13 Bazerman, M.H, & Moore, D.A. (2009). Judgment in managerial decision making. John Wiley & Sons.
14 Baumeister, R.F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K.D. (2001). Bad is stronger than good. Review of General 
Psychology, 5(4), 323-370.
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desired outcomes are occurring or that the theory of change is playing out as intended. 
This approach takes a different tact by designing literature reviews, interviews, data 
FROOHFWLRQDQGOHDUQLQJGLVFXVVLRQVVSHFLĆFDOO\WRĆQGDQGH[SORUHGDWDWKDWDUJXHDJDLQVW
foundation perspectives, assumptions, and hopes. 
It can be hard to get the bad news from grantees and partners who compete for a founda-
tion’s resources, so it also may be helpful to ask people outside of the foundation’s normal 
circle to share any signals they see that a particular problem is not improving, or that an 
organization is not performing as well as hoped. Before deciding if a favorite grantee should 
receive increased funding, ask why the grantee might not be the best one for the job. Before 
pursuing a particular solution to a complex problem, ask why that solution might be a bad 
idea—who might react negatively and what adverse effects might it cause? This kind of 
intentional focus on the story we do not want to hear may not lead us down a different path, 
but it can raise issues or challenges we had not considered.15
4. Focus on trends rather than individual experiences.
Rather than selecting the most dramatic or seemingly compelling quote or story to illus-
WUDWHSURJUHVVRUHYDOXDWLRQĆQGLQJVLWLVEHWWHUSUDFWLFHWRIRFXVRQUHSUHVHQWDWLYHDQ-
ecdotes or quotes—or a range of stories or quotes—that help strategists develop a more 
accurate understanding of the frequency or probability of a particular condition or event.  
5. Remind yourself what you do not know.
,QWKHGD\VEHIRUHWKHĆUVW86LQYDVLRQRI,UDTLQWKHHDUO\V6HFUHWDU\RI'HIHQVH
&ROLQ3RZHOOUHJXODUO\VDLGWRKLVLQWHOOLJHQFHRIĆFHUVê7HOOPHZKDW\RXNQRZWHOOPH
what you don’t know, and only then can you tell me what you think.”16 By instituting a 
practice of explicitly stating what is unknown or uncertain about a problem (e.g., its causes, 
history, effects, magnitude, variations) and what is unknown about the proposed solution 
(e.g., the level of “market demand” for the solution, where it has worked and why, how 
much money it will cost to be successful), staff can become more aware of potential blind 
spots and also build their ability to design more thorough research processes.
6. Play out alternate perspectives and solutions. 
During strategy planning processes and midcourse reviews, it is useful to keep track of 
alternative perspectives about the nature of the problem, as well as competing or oppos-
ing hypotheses about the best way forward. Planning groups should explore questions 
such as: What would you do if alternative perspectives about either the problem or the 
VROXWLRQZHUHULJKW"&DQ\RXĆQGDZD\IRUZDUGWKDWHQFRPSDVVHVPRUHWKDQRQHRIWKH
SRVVLEOHVROXWLRQV",QDGGLWLRQZKHQPRQLWRULQJGDWDHYDOXDWLRQĆQGLQJVRUVWDNHKROGHU
feedback send mixed signals about whether the strategy is working or a grantee is suc-
cessful, explore which solution might be pursued if each perspective was accepted as true. 
15 Heath, C., & Heath, D. (2013). How to make better choices in life and work. New York: Crown Business. 
16:ULJKW/-DQXDU\7KH6S\PDVWHU&DQ0LNH0F&RQQHOOĆ[$PHULFDèVLQWHOOLJHQFHFRPPXQLW\"The New 
Yorker. Retrieved from http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/01/21/080121fa_fact_wright?currentPage=all
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%XLOGIRUZDUGORRNLQJFRVWEHQHĆWHVWLPDWLRQVLQWRSURFHVVHV
While foundations are more susceptible to escalation of commitment as their resource 
expenditure grows, these “sunk costs” are not relevant to the value of a decision going 
forward. When deciding whether to continue on the chosen path or to change direction—
whether with a grantee, a strategy, or a data system—foundations should calculate or 
HVWLPDWHWKHH[SHFWHGEHQHĆWVRIDGHFLVLRQYHUVXVLWVFRVWVstarting today. 
8. Encourage course corrections.
0XFKDVWKHPHGLDDQGYRWHUVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVURXWLQHO\SXQLVKêćLSćRSSLQJëSROL-
ticians, many organizations inadvertently discourage staff from changing course, even 
when data and learning suggest they should. Boards and executive staff can amplify 
escalation of commitment when they reward program staff for ushering their strategies 
WKURXJKWKHDSSURYDOSURFHVVZLWKRXWDQ\VLJQLĆFDQWFKDOOHQJHVTXHVWLRQVRUFKDQJHV
Praising and rewarding staff for being willing to rethink past decisions (and modeling that 
behavior at the board and executive level) can minimize the sense of personal stake that 
drives escalation of commitment.
9. Develop decision teams that include more than the original  
decision makers. 
An ongoing decision team that includes more than those who developed the strategy 
originally (and who therefore have a personal investment in the existing course of ac-
tion) can help to minimize several cognitive traps. This can be challenging in foundations 
ZKHUHDVLQJOHSURJUDPRIĆFHUêRZQVëDVWUDWHJ\RUKDVDORQJWHUPUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKD
grantee, and therefore has the most knowledge about the problem, the context, and what 
has worked to date. In this situation, it may be useful to employ an external contractor to 
assess the relative value of different alternative paths going forward, one of which is the 
current course of action.
10. Build earlier check-ins into the strategy approval process.
Rather than presenting strategies to executive staff or boards when they are fully 
baked, foundations should consider an earlier and more regular check-in process that 
presents emerging data along with two to three possible pathways forward for real dis-
cussion. Describing options and their tradeoffs rather than presenting a single recom-
mended path will allow for doubts and gaps to be explored jointly rather than covered 
RYHURQO\WRUHDSSHDUODWHU%ULHć\GRFXPHQWLQJNH\GHFLVLRQVPDGHLQWKRVHGLVFXV-
sions along with the supporting rationale can increase staff and executives’ recognition 
that complex work involves risks, tradeoffs, and a level of uncertainty, all of which is 
better managed in an ongoing way during implementation rather than by creating the 
“perfect” plan.  
11. Reduce upfront strategy planning time in favor of ongoing 
strategy development.
Although rigorous planning in philanthropy serves the important purpose of guarding 
against the squandering of resources, the implementation of strategy “is too complex to 
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DVVXPHWKDWVWUDWHJ\FDQEHGHYHORSHGDWMXVWRQHSRLQWLQWLPHDQGUHPDLQĆ[HGë17 Theo-
ries of change that project pathways to success with great detail for years into the future 




understanding that the strategy will continue to develop (and they will continue to be 
FRQVXOWHGRYHUWLPH7KHRULHVRIFKDQJHDQGPHWULFVRIVXFFHVVFDQEHćHVKHGRXWDV
staff and grantees learn and strategies evolve. By setting up the expectation that strategy 
decisions will be revisited on a more frequent basis, the tendency to escalate commitment 
in particular can be minimized.
CONCLUSION
Understanding the pitfalls of cognitive traps and applying techniques to avoid them 
will not guarantee good decisions or successful strategies. The availability of good data 
and application of thorough analysis, for example, also are key. But even when these are 
in place, cognitive traps can thwart even the best analysis and the smartest strategic 
minds.19 Many of the techniques suggested here are relatively simple ideas that can be 
applied easily in any decision-making context. While it’s true that some decisions have 
only minor consequences, foundations implementing high-value, high-impact strategies 
DUHOLNHO\WRĆQGWKHHIIRUWWRPDNHEHWWHUGHFLVLRQVLVERWKZDUUDQWHGDQGZHOOZRUWKLW
17 Patrizi, P. & Thompson, E., (2011). Beyond the veneer of strategic philanthropy. The Foundation Review, 2(3), 52-60.
18 Patrizi, P., Thompson, E., Coffman, J., & Beer, T. (2013). Eyes wide open: Learning as strategy under conditions of 
complexity and uncertainty. The Foundation Review, 5(3), 50-65.
19 West, R.F., Meserve, R.J., & Stanovich, K.E. (2012). Cognitive sophistication does not attenuate the bias blind spot. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 103(3), 506-519.
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